We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.
"The 855-page Senate bill... contains a path to citizenship. Proponents avoid calling it amnesty, even as they tout the moral imperative of bringing 11 million people out of the shadows.
Opponents wield the word as a weapon, decrying amnesty as a free pass to lawbreakers..." Cindy Chang (2013) 1
Introduction
Growing migration pressures in the presence of restrictive immigration policies have made illegal immigration widespread, and most rich destination countries harbor today large populations of undocumented foreigners.
2 Among host countries, the U.S. stands out as one the largest recipients of illegal immigrants (Dustmann and Frattini 2013) , and recent estimates suggest that in 2014, 11.3 million individuals, or 3.5% of the total population, was made up by irregular migrants. The legal status of migrants clearly reflects the policy stance of the destination country, both in terms of the ex-ante controls introduced to discipline the flows, and the expost measures taken to grant legal status. In particular, amnesties have been the focus of much attention, and much controversy.
The purpose of this paper is to study the trade-offs faced by politician in the decision to support the introduction of an immigration amnesty. To address this question, we develop a model in which immigration policy involves a minimum skill requirement, which cannot be perfectly enforced, 3 leading to the possible presence of illegal immigrants. To establish whether an amnesty is desirable, our analysis focuses on a novel cost-benefit calculus, involving a potential welfare gain arising from the new labor market opportunities available to legalized migrants, and a potential loss resulting from them gaining access to the welfare state. More specifically, in our model the labor market is characterized by imperfect skill matching between employers and employees, and by the presence of a formal sector, where only legal migrants can find employment, and of an informal one, to which illegal immigrants are restricted. As a result, some illegal workers who could have taken up a qualified job in the formal sector, are prevented from doing so, leading to a potential output loss. The role of the welfare state is captured by a simple redistributive mechanism consisting of a proportional tax levied on the formal sector and of a lump-sum benefit paid to all natives and legal migrants, whereas illegal immigrants are instead excluded from it.
1 LA Times May 12, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/12/local/la-me-amnesty-20130513.
2 Throughout the paper we will use "irregular", "illegal" and "undocumented" immigrants as synonyms.
3 This is of course only one of the many features of the migration policies in place in destination countries. We focus on it to simultaneously model the presence of legal and illegal immigrants. The same objective could be achieved by introducing a policy taking the form of a migration quota as in Facchini and Testa (2010) . For a discussion see Section 2.
We show that the incentives to support an amnesty are stronger, the greater is the improvement in the labor market opportunities available to legalized workers as a result of them gaining access to the formal sector. At the same time, a more redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable, as low-skilled legalized foreign workers will gain access to benefits.
In the second part of the paper, we empirically assess the predictions of our model. To this end, we study the determinants of the voting behavior of U.S. Representatives on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA H.R. 3810) of 1986. Voting on IRCA is an ideal testing ground for our theory for two reasons. First, the enactment of this bill resulted in one of the largest legalization programs ever undertaken in the Western world: 2,8 million individualsor 1.2 percent of the total population of the country -became entitled to permanent residency, with long lasting consequences for the U.S. economy and for the political debate around immigration reform. Second, the data at our disposal are unique as we can match the voting behavior of elected congressmen to a wealth of constituency level characteristics. This allows us to construct detailed measures of the labor market mismatch of illegal immigrants before the legalization took place -based on the degree of over-education of immigrants in each two digit occupation -and of the local fiscal exposure to immigration -based on the fact that some high immigration districts are characterized by high levels of local tax payments, while others are not. Our empirical analysis shows that the drivers identified in the theoretical framework play a key role. In particular, our preferred specification indicates that a 10 percentage points increase (about 60% of a standard deviation) in the labor market mismatch suffered by illegal immigrants is correlated with a 3.95 percentage points (or about 6.8% at the sample mean) increase in the probability of supporting IRCA. Furthermore, representatives of districts characterized by high local exposure to the fiscal effects of a legalization (13.6% of all districts) are 27.4 percentage points (47% at the sample mean) less likely to support it than representatives of districts characterized by a low fiscal exposure. Finally, a ten percent increase in median family income in the district (about two thousand USD, or half of a standard deviation) is associated with a 8 percentage points (13.8% at the sample mean) decrease in the probability of a representative supporting IRCA.
Besides the factors highlighted in our theoretical model, the existing literature has emphasized the role played by several drivers that might influence a representative's voting behavior on immigration reform. Thus, to assess the robustness of our findings, we explore the role played by several additional individual-level and constituency level characteristics. While we find that several of these factors do matter, our main results are unaffected. The same holds true when we use alternative econometric specifications, and account for the possibility of sample selection. Our results confirm that the expected impact of labor market mismatch and of the generosity of the welfare state are robust drivers of support for IRCA. This paper contributes to the small but growing literature on immigration amnesties. Chau (2001) shows that legalizing undocumented workers can be part of an optimal migration policy package -together with internal and border controls -when there is a time inconsistency problem because the government cannot commit to implement the ex-ante optimal frequency of internal controls. Importantly, in her model all workers share the same skill level and all immigrants are ex-ante undocumented. They can become legal only as a result of an amnesty. Karlson and Katz (2003) develop a model of illegal immigration focusing instead on the role of amnesties as a tool for governments to induce immigrants to self-select based on ability.
In particular, they emphasize that a legalization will offer skilled workers better labor market opportunities. As a result, the latter might be enticed to migrate even as illegals, in the hope that an ex-post legalization will improve their income opportunities.
4 Differently from Chau (2001) and Karlson and Katz (2003) , besides considering heterogeneous workers and firms, we allow for the co-existence of legal and illegal immigrants.
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Epstein and Weiss (2011) also study the desirability of legalization programs. In their setting, immigrants can only enter the country illegally, and can become legal as the result of an amnesty. Immigration is always costly from the destination country's point of view, and the cost depends only on the total number of immigrants, and not on their skill level. Moreover, migrants earn the same wages irrespective of their status. Empirical evidence has instead pointed out that the wages of legalized migrants do improve following an amnesty, and so do wage growth and return to skill (Borjas and Tienda 1993 , Kaushal 2006 and Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael 2007 . This is likely due to an increase in the geographical and occupational mobility of legalized migrants and in the quality of their job matches Bansak 2011 and Steigleder and Sparber 2015) . More generally, the skill level of the illegal migrant population is likely to be an important determinant of the welfare consequences of a legalization program, and modeling this lies at the center of our analysis.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup, whereas section 3 establishes the conditions for the desirability of an amnesty. Section 4 outlines the debate around the introduction of IRCA, and section 5 describes the data we use. Section 6 develops our empirical analysis. Section 7 assesses the robustness of our results and section 8 concludes.
4 See Docquier and Rapoport (2012) for a recent survey on the economics of skilled migration. 5 For a political economy model of immigration amnesties, see also Chau (2003) . 6 For a quantitative assessment of the effect of an amnesty in the United States, see Machado (2013) .
The model
To analyze the drivers of support for immigration amnesties, we consider a simple model with a polity featuring D districts/constituencies. In the representative district, domestic production factors and foreign workers are combined to produce a single good. They are assumed to be complements, and are both required for positive output levels to be generated. As a result, the presence of migrants in the labor market is necessarily beneficial, generating the "gains from migration" that have been emphasized in the literature (Berry and Soligo 1969, Borjas 1995) .
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Yet, the presence of a redistributive welfare state implies that these gains must be traded off against the potential welfare losses induced by the leakage of benefits to migrants.
8
For simplicity, we will think of the domestic factor owners as entrepreneurs. 9 There are I potentially active firms in the constituency, each one of them indexed by i, with i distributed according to the density function n(i) on the interval [0, 1]. Firms can be ranked according to their skill intensity and a higher value of i indicates a higher skill requirement, with 1 being the most skill-intensive firm. The mass of the domestic population is given by N , where I ≥ N .
Potential immigrants differ in their ability, and are indexed by j, with j distributed according to the density function m(j) on the interval [0, 1], with 1 being the highest skill level. To capture in a simple fashion labor market imperfections, we use a random matching framework whereby individual abilities and a vacancy's skill requirement are not necessarily perfectly combined and consequently some highly qualified workers might end up in low-skill jobs, some others may be unemployed, and/or some firms might not be able to find suitable members of staff. Formally, if a migrant is employed, a match of value v(i, j) is created and shared between natives and migrants, where
Note that since higher values of j characterize more skilled individuals, it is reasonable to assume that v(j), i.e. the maximum value of the match generated by a worker of skill j, increases with j. This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1 . At the same time, equation 1 implies that the value of the match for worker j is maximized if he occupies a vacancy offered by a firm of type j. Furthermore, this value is zero if a migrant of skill level j ends up in a job 7 Modeling the presence of substitutability between migrants and natives would complicate the model, without affecting our analysis since the decision to support or not an amnesty is determined by the constituency's aggregate welfare.
8 For evidence on the leakage of welfare state benefits from natives to migrants, see Borjas and Hilton (1996) Borjas and Trejo (1991) and Razin and Sadka (2000) . 9 We have chosen this terminology for expositional convenience, but we could as well think of domestic factor owners simply as workers whose skills are combined in a firm with those of the migrants to produce output, and our results would not be affected. i > j, no value is created, i.e. v(i, j) = 0. The probability that individual j is matched to vacancy i is described by the joint density function f (i, j).
A formal and an informal sector coexist in the economy, and we assume that on average the former requires a more highly skilled labor force than the latter. This is consistent with the evidence reported by Schneider (2011) , who documents that the shadow economy is particularly large in unskilled labor intensive industries such as construction, wholesale and retail trade and hotels and restaurants. We model the different factor requirements of the two sectors by assuming that firms with skill intensity above a given thresholdĩ represent the formal economy, whereas firms with skill intensity belowĩ constitute the informal economy.
The status quo migration policy -common to all constituencies -involves a minimum skill requirement j * for legal migrants, which cannot be perfectly enforced. The result is that illegal immigration will emerge if the policy is always binding, i.e. if there are always more migrants willing to enter than those accepted as legals. We will assume this to be the case throughout our analysis. 11 Importantly, while legal migrants can work in both sectors, illegal immigrants do not enjoy the same employment opportunities, and can work only in the informal sector.
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Note that modeling the migration policy as a minimum skill requirement enables us to capture an important difference between legal and illegal migrants, i.e. the fact that the former are -on average -more skilled than the latter (see for instance Passel 2005 and Hanson 2007 ).
Furthermore, skill selective immigration policies are becoming increasingly widespread among many important destination countries, as documented by Boeri et al. (2012) .
The number of legal migrants, i.e. those whose skill level is above the threshold j * , is given by M (j * , 1) = 1 j * m(j)dj, whereas the number of illegal immigrants is given by M (j ill , j * ) = j * j ill m(j)dj, where j ill is the exogenously given skill level of the least qualified migrant worker entering the country illegally. If legal migrants are employed in the formal sector, they generate a total expected income denoted by
whereas if they end up in the informal sector, they generate a total expected income given by
Illegal migrants can work only in the informal sector, i.e. for every illegal migrant j, with j < j * , v(i, j) = 0 if i >ĩ. They generate an expected income given by
Our assumption that immigration policy is always binding results in j ill < j * , i.e. illegal immigration always takes place. Moreover, to make the problem interesting, we impose that j ill <ĩ < j * , i.e. that at least some illegal migrants are sufficiently skilled that in the absence of restrictions to their employment opportunities, they could be employed in the formal sector.
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The top portion of Figure 2 illustrates the status of migrants according to their skill level, whereas the bottom one shows the breakdown of firms between those active in the formal and those active in the informal sector, depending on their skill intensity. Natives and migrants share the expected value of a match. Let α and β be respectively the fractions which are appropriated by each firm's owner in the formal and in the informal sectors, with β ≥ α to capture the idea that the bargaining power of firms' owners is likely to be larger in the informal 12 Notice that our results would not be affected if we allowed the two sectors to partially overlap in terms of skill intensity, as long as illegal immigrants continue to be restricted in their labor market opportunities.
13 This assumption is in line with the evidence reported in indicating that the wages of legalized migrants increase as a result of the legalization. The district is characterized by the presence of a redistributive welfare system, which has important implications for the desirability of an immigration amnesty (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002) . We assume that redistribution takes place by means of an exogenously given proportional income tax τ and a lump-sum transfer b, which adjusts in order to keep the budget balanced. All natives and legal immigrants in the formal sector contribute to the welfare system, whereas both natives and migrants active in the informal sector do not. All natives and legal migrants are entitled to receive the welfare state benefits, whereas illegal migrants are not.
14 The constituency's budget is thus given by
To capture the existence of a fiscal leakage from natives to immigrants (Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002) , we consider the relationship between the average taxable income of the natives and the average taxable income of the immigrants. For any j, the former is given by
whereas the latter is captured by
The condition for the presence of a fiscal leakage can then be rewritten as
If at a given j equation 8 is satisfied, the implication is that on average natives will be net contributors to the welfare state, whereas immigrants will be on average net receivers. At the same time, it might well be that some migrants are net contributors and some natives end up on the receiving end of the welfare state.
3 When is a legalization desirable?
In this section we determine the conditions under which a legalization program is desirable from the point of view of a policy maker who maximizes the aggregate welfare of the natives in her constituency.
15 If an amnesty is introduced, it involves all illegal immigrants, 16 and will have the following effects. First, legalized migrants will have access to the full set of occupations,
i.e. those in the formal and those in the informal sector. At the same time, they will receive benefits from the welfare state, but they will contribute to it only if they work in the formal sector. In other words, legalized migrants share the same rights and obligations as the natives.
The welfare of the constituency is denoted by w z , with z ∈ {A, NA}, where A stands for amnesty and NA for the lack of it. If no legalization is implemented, at the status quo policy j * we have
with b N A = b determined from equation 5. Thus, welfare depends on the net income accruing to the natives from the employment of legal migrants in the formal sector (first term on the right hand side), in the informal sector (second term) and on the lump-sum fiscal transfer received by the natives (third term). If an amnesty is introduced we have instead
15 The process through which the aggregation of individual preferences takes place is obviously more complex, but welfare maximization is a useful theoretical benchmark. In our empirical analysis we take that into account, for example, by exploring the role played by pressure groups. 16 We do not consider selective amnesties, as this would complicate the analysis, without changing the main determinants of the introduction of legalization programs. Moreover, the conditions we uncover for the desirability of general amnesties are more stringent than those which would apply to the implementation of selective measures.
Note that when a legalization is implemented (see equation 10) all migrants present in the constituency can be employed in the formal sector (first term in equation 10), but some of them will still end up in the informal one (second term in equation 10). We can then establish the following result:
Proposition 1 A legalization is more likely to be supported the bigger is the gain to aggregate income accruing to natives by allowing legalized workers access to a broader range of occupations, which will increase the quality of their match, and the smaller is the change in the redistributive benefit paid out by the welfare state. In addition, the smaller is the size of the welfare state, the more likely it is that a legalization is supported.
Proof. Subtracting equation 9 from equation 10 we obtain the following expression, which captures the incentives faced by the policy maker to support an amnesty:
The first term captures the labor market matching channel: the bigger is V (j ill , j * ;ĩ, 1), the more likely it is that an amnesty will be supported. The second term captures the change in the redistributive benefit received by the natives following the legalization, and denotes the effect of the welfare state on the desirability of an amnesty. In the presence of a fiscal leakage from the natives to the immigrants, both legal and legalized, (i.e. equation 8 is satisfied at j = j ill ),
all immigrants working in the formal sector are fully engaged in the welfare state and their taxable income is on average lower than that of natives. The second term is therefore negative. The larger the difference is, the less likely it is that the legalization is supported.
Furthermore, note that
In other words, a larger size of the redistributive welfare state will make an amnesty less desirable, as it increases the welfare leakage to the migrants.
Summing up, our theoretical model indicates that, for a policy maker who maximizes the aggregate welfare of natives in her constituency, the incentives to legalize are stronger the bigger is the gain to expected aggregate (net) income brought about by granting legalized workers access to all the available employment opportunities. In addition, a more redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable, as it entitles lower-skilled legalized foreign workers to benefits. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the empirical relevance of the labor market and welfare state channels in explaining the incentives to support a legalization program.
IRCA
To assess the implications of our theoretical model, we study the determinants of the voting behavior of U.S. representatives on the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.
IRCA introduced the largest immigrant legalization in U.S. history, which enabled 2.8 million undocumented immigrants to gain permanent legal status.
To understand the context in which IRCA was introduced, we must bear in mind that U.S.
immigration policy was fundamentally changed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which abolished the national-origin quota system introduced in the Twenties. Instead, a quota of 170,000 was introduced for the Eastern hemisphere, with a cap of 20,000 admissions for each individual country. Moreover, a new quota for the Western hemisphere -which had been exempted under the old regime -was also devised, setting an overall limit of 120,000
admissions, but without an individual country cap. Following the first oil crisis and the ensuing stagflation, Congress introduced a series of restrictive immigration policy measures, ranging from provisions for employer sanctions to tackle the growing employment of undocumented immigrants, to the extension of the applicability of the 20,000 per-country cap to migrants from the Western hemisphere, a measure aimed at limiting immigration from Mexico Steinhardt 2011 and Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . In 1978 the two quotas were merged in an overall worldwide total of 290,000 permanent admissions, with a 20,000 limit for each individual country (Hatton 2015) .
To respond to the increasing concerns about the growing size of the undocumented im- 
Data
The construction of our dataset draws on a number of different sources.
We obtained information on individual representatives' voting behavior on IRCA from the VOTEVIEW project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) Lublin (1997) and Adler (2003) .
In some specifications we will also control for additional factors that may drive a representative's voting behavior. First, we account for the ethnic composition of each district by including the share of the population with an African-American or Latino background, taken from the 20 See Bureau of the Census (1982). 21 Local governments comprise counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and independent school districts.
22 In particular, we compute weighted averages based on the share of each county in the total population of the district. This applies also to counties split across more than one district. In this case a county's population is attributed to a particular district, assuming that the former is geographically uniformly distributed. For a similar approach see for instance .
23 For a similar procedure, see Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) .
i.e. the ratio of foreign to natives in the district's working age population. We also construct a variable measuring the share of the population living in urban areas, to account for potential differences between rural and urban areas in attitudes toward immigrants' legalization. A district's factor endowment has been shown to play an important role in shaping policy preferences, and we measure it with the district-level share of individuals with at least a bachelor's degree in the total population over 25 years of age. We additionally include the district-level unemployment rate, defined as the ratio of individuals looking for a job out of the total labor force. We also control for the sectoral composition of the local economy, using the share of individuals in the labor force employed in each one digit sector. 24 Finally, since pressure groups may play a significant role in determining representatives' voting behavior, in some robustness checks we proxy for their influence using data on labor and corporate Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions, provided by the Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/). As PAC contributions measure lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we construct two indicator variables taking a value of one if the politician has received contributions that are at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.
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We report summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis in Table 1 . As we can see, IRCA was a controversial measure, and cleared the House with a 58 to 42 percent majority.
On average, the share of undocumented immigrants who are over-educated in a district is around 10 percent, whereas the corresponding figure for natives is approximately 13 percent.
This difference can be explained by the fact that undocumented migrants are substantially less educated than natives -on average they have only 8.5 years of education, compared with 13.35 for the natives. As a result they are less likely than natives to be employed in occupations which require less education than the level they have attained. 26 Finally, the share of districts exhibiting high local tax exposure is approximately 7 percent of the total and the median family income is approximately 20,055 US dollars, with a standard deviation of 4,003.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the main forces at work in our model. In particular, Figure 4 reports a map of Florida's congressional districts during the 99th congress. 27 Consider district according to our definition, the same is true for less than 1% of the undocumented residents of district 12. 28 Our theoretical model suggests that the incentives to legalize will be, ceteris paribus, higher in district 15 than in district 12. In fact, the representative of district 12, Tom
Lewis ( 
Empirical analysis
Our model identifies two drivers that play a role in shaping support for the introduction of an amnesty. It suggests that an amnesty is more desirable the higher is the share of overeducated illegal immigrants, since this leads to a larger expected output gain associated to the legalization. At the same time, the more generous is the welfare state, the less desirable is an amnesty, as the fiscal leakage to migrants is more severe. To assess these predictions, we estimate the following logit model:
where V is instead a vector of district-level controls, including economic (the share of native workers that are over-educated, skill ratio, unemployment rate and share of workers employed in each one digit sector), residential (share of urban population), and ethnic characteristics (share of 28 As a result, district 15 is at the 83rd percentile of the distribution, whereas district 12 is in the bottom 25%.
immigrants, share of African American and Latino residents). Finally, I s are state dummies that account for unobserved state-specific factors.
is the distribution function of the logistic distribution. exists a positive and statistically significant relationship between the share of over-educated illegal immigrants in a district and the probability of a representative voting in favor of IRCA. This is consistent with the prediction of our model that a larger mismatch between undocumented immigrants' skills and their job increases the likelihood that a representative will support a legalization program. As for the role of the welfare state, the results in column 1 indicate that a greater welfare leakage towards immigrants -as measured by our two complementary measures -has a negative impact on support for an amnesty, but this effect is not statistically significant.
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As pointed out in the literature, several other factors might explain the support for immigration policy reform (Facchini and Steinhardt 2011) and, as a result, our parsimonious specification might suffer from an omitted variable bias. For instance, Democratic districts are likely to exhibit both higher local taxes, and express a representative who is in favor of IRCA.
If this is the case, then the omission of a representative's party affiliation biases the estimated effect of High local tax exposure towards 0. For this reason, in column (2) we augment our basic specification to include a series of representative-level controls such as age, gender and an indicator for whether he is a Democrat. Interestingly, we find that Democratic representatives have a 37.5 percentage points higher probability of supporting IRCA than their Republican counterparts, even within the same state. Furthermore, the estimated effect of high local tax exposure becomes considerably more negative and statistically significant.
In column (3) we additionally control for a set of district-level characteristics. We find that representatives of districts characterized by a higher share of the population living in urban areas are more likely to support IRCA. Similarly, we find that representatives of more skilled labor abundant districts are also more in favor of the amnesty, confirming previous findings in the literature suggesting that complementarities between the skills of natives and immigrants play an important role in explaining support for migration liberalization (Facchini and Steinhardt 29 Average marginal effects are calculated as the mean of the marginal effects obtained by varying the variable of interest for a given observation, while holding all other controls at their original values.
30 Note that the model is estimated on 347 observations, despite the fact that 396 representatives voted on IRCA, because in 49 instances there is no within-state variation in direction of vote thus these observations are dropped in logit's maximum likelihood estimations. The states that are dropped are: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
2011). Finally, we find that representatives of districts characterized by a larger share of African
Americans in the population are less likely to support the legalization programs. A possible explanation is represented by the fact that this group is the most likely to face direct competition by legalized migrants in the labor market. We find also some evidence that representatives of districts characterized by a larger Hispanic population are less likely to support this initiative.
In fact, as we have already argued in section 4, Hispanics held ambiguous views towards this legislation, and several Hispanic pressure groups were concerned with some of the provisions of IRCA, in particular those aimed at tightening up immigration policy enforcement, that would make employing illegal immigrants in the future more difficult and increase the pervasiveness of racial profiling. Our specification also includes as control the share of native workers in the district that are over-educated to account for the general skill mismatch, and we find that the latter does not play a significant role in explaining the choice of the local representative. Turning to our key explanatory variables, controlling for additional district characteristics strengthens the empirical support for our model. In particular the estimated effect of median family income becomes considerably more negative and statistically significant. In our last specification in column (4) we additionally control for the distribution of employment across industrial sectors in a given district. Our main results are unaffected.
Summarizing, our empirical findings provide strong support to the predictions of the theoretical model. In terms of the magnitudes of the effects, our preferred specification in column (4) indicates that an increase by ten percentage points in the share of over-educated illegals (about 60% of a standard deviation) leads on average to an increase of 3.95 percentage points in the probability of a representative voting in favor of IRCA (an increase of about 6.8% at the sample mean); at the same time, representatives of district facing high local fiscal exposure to immigrant legalization (13.6% of the total) are 27.4 percentage points (47% at the sample mean) less likely to support IRCA; finally, a ten percent increase in median family income in the district (about two thousand USD, or half of a standard deviation) is associated with a 8 percentage points (13.8% at the sample mean) decrease in the probability of a representative supporting IRCA.
Robustness Checks
In this section we assess the robustness of our results.
We start in Table 3 by experimenting with alternative definitions of our key explanatory variables, using the specification in column (4) of Table 2 as the benchmark, which to simplify comparisons is reported in column (1).
31 In columns (2) and (3) we use alternative definitions 31 Note that we omit the coefficients for the individual and district level characteristics to make the table more of the over-education index. In column (2) we classify as over-educated individuals with a schooling level higher than the mode of their occupation, rather than one standard deviation higher than the mode, as in our main specification; in column (3), instead, we compute the baseline over-education index referring to the median value of the schooling level within occupations, rather than to the mode. Results with both alternative indices closely resemble those of the benchmark. In columns (4) and (5) we use alternative measures of the extent of local redistribution. First, in column (4) we redefine our High local tax exposure indicator. In particular, we characterize a district as having "high illegal immigration" if it has a share of illegal immigrants in the top 25% of the districts, rather than above the mean as in our benchmark case. In column (5), we instead rely on mean, rather than on median family income to capture a district's fiscal stance visá vis the federal government. The results are qualitatively unaffected.
In Table 4 , we report results with alternative or additional control variables, while keeping the definition of our main explanatory variables as in the benchmark. First, in columns (1) and (2), we experiment with different measures of the ideological orientation of the representative.
In column (1) we replace democratic party affiliation with the normalized DW nominate score -which increases in an individual's conservative orientation, whereas in column 2 we use the ADA score, which assesses every legislator on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher figures assigned to more liberal politicians. 32 As expected, we still find that more liberal-leaning representatives are more likely to support IRCA, while the estimates of our main coefficients are not affected.
In column (3) we additionally control for the share of democratic votes in the 1984 congressional election. This does not play a significant role, and does not affect our main results.
In columns (4) and (5) we replace our measure of a district's skill composition with the ratio of high school graduates and college graduates to high school dropouts (column 4) and the ratio of individuals employed in high versus low skilled occupations (column 5). Our results are unaffected. In column (6) we replace the immigrants/natives ratio in the district's working age population with a more flexible functional form specification, i.e. the logarithm of the number of immigrant and native residents in the same age range. Once again, our results are not affected. Finally, since pressure groups may play a significant role in determining representatives' voting behavior, in column (7) we proxy for their influence using data on labor and corporate Political Action Committees (PAC) contributions. As PAC contributions readable. Note though that the patterns identified for these controls in column (4) of Table 2 continue to hold throughout. 32 The DW-nominate measure is provided by the VOTEVIEW project, whereas the ADA score is constructed by the American for Democratic Action, a lobby group. The main difference between the former and the latter is that the ADA score uses only votes on a sub-sample of bills cast in each congress, whereas the DW nominate score employs every roll call vote in each congress, and is based on a more sophisticated estimation procedure. The ADA score is not available for representatives of Texas 1st and Louisiana's 8th congressional districts because these presentatives were elected in a 1985 by-election and thus did not take part in enough votes to construct their score. measure lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we construct two indicator variables (P acCorporate and P acLabor) taking a value of one if the politician has received contributions that are at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year.
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Interestingly, our results show that larger contributions by business-related lobbies result in a higher likelihood of voting pro-IRCA. At the same time, labor PAC contributions do not appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials. The size and significance of our regressors of interest is however not affected.
Finally, we have performed several checks to assess the robustness of our results to alternative econometric specifications. We display these results in Table 5 . In column (1) we start by reporting mean marginal effects from estimating a probit model, rather than a logit model as in our main analysis. Our findings are comparable to those in our baseline results in column (4) of Table 2 .
In the presence of state fixed effects, both our logit and probit specifications use information only from states in which all congressional representatives did not vote in the same way. To use instead all the information available in our data -thus increasing by approximately 15 percent the number of observations effectively used -we report in column (2) the results of a linear probability model. Importantly, the size and significance of our main coefficients of interest is practically unaffected.
As we have already discussed in Section 5, IRCA was very controversial and out of a total of 433 members of the House, 34 37 decided not to cast a ballot in favor or against the measure.
In our baseline specification we have simply omitted districts whose representative did not vote on IRCA, but this choice might lead to biased estimates if the selection of representatives into voting is non-random. To address this concern, we have additionally estimated a two-step
Heckman selection model and the results are reported in columns (3) and (4). In particular,
we have implemented the following specification: is not a concern, and equation 15 can be estimated consistently on its own. These 'stand alone'
estimates are those reported in column (2) of conditional on X, affects the probability of casting a ballot without directly affecting the vote on the migration initiative.
To this end, for each representative we have constructed a proxy for her propensity to cast a ballot in that Congress, P articipation d , using the share of "Yes" or "No" votes cast over all roll call votes are available, with the exclusion of those on IRCA. This variable is arguably correlated with the probability to take part on the IRCA vote but, conditional on all other control variables, should not have a direct effect on the likelihood to support IRCA. Columns (3) and (4) report our findings. Focusing on the estimates of the selection equation reported in column (4), we can immediately see that the coefficient of P articipation d is positive and strongly significant, suggesting that this variable affects the probability of casting a ballot on migration bills. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of the inverse of the Mills' ratio indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias, as it is positive and statistically significant. Still, the magnitude and statistical significance of our main results do not appear to be affected (see column 3).
8 Conclusions
We have developed a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic trade-offs faced by an elected official in the decision to support an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. In our model we have shown that an amnesty is more desirable the bigger is the gain to aggregate income induced by granting legalized workers access to all the available employment opportunities. On the contrary, a more redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable, as lower-skilled legalized foreign workers become entitled to welfare state benefits.
We have then assessed the relevance of the drivers identified by our theoretical analysis by studying the role played by each of them in determining the voting behavior of members of the U.S. Congress on the IRCA legalization program. We have found strong support for our model, obtaining results that are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.
We can think of several avenues along which our analysis could be extended. First, in our theoretical setting the policy maker acts as a pure welfare maximizer. 36 An alternative would involve taking explicitly into account political economy forces that do play an important role in shaping immigration policy and its enforcement. Second, our theoretical analysis has abstracted away from the problem of aggregating individual congressmen preferences and the possibility of strategic interactions among representatives. Clearly, coalition building in Congress is a complex issue, as the failure of passing a comprehensive immigration policy reform during the Obama administration has shown. While both are important questions, we leave them for future research. Table 1 for the definition of the variables. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Table 1 for the definition of main variables. Illegals' over-education (above the mode) and (1 sd above the median) is, respectively, the share of Mexican and Salvadorean workers with a level of education higher than the mode or the median + 1sd of natives' education in their occupation. Alternative high local tax exposure is a dummy variable that identifies the districts above the mean per capita revenues of local governments and above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the share of Mexican and Salvadorian immigrants in the total population. Mean family income measures the mean family income within a district in thousand dollars. ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Table 1 for the definition of main variables. In columns (1) and (2) we use alternative measures of the ideological orientation of the representative and replace Democrat with DW -nominate score , which is the normalized DW nominate score (column (1)) and with the ADA score (column (2)). In column (3) we control additionally for the share of Democratic votes in the last congressional election. In columns (4) and (5) we use alternative measures of a district's Skill ratio and replace skill ratio with Alternative skill ratio , the ratio of high school graduates and college graduates to high school dropouts (column 4) and with Occupational skill ratio, the ratio of individuals employed in high versus low skilled occupations (column 5). In column (6) we replace the Immigrants/natives ratio in the district's working age population with Log natives and Log immigrants, the logarithm of the number of native and immigrant residents in the same age range. In column (7), we control for PACLabor and PACCorporate which are measures of the intensity of the lobbying activity and take a value of one if the labor/corporate contributions that the representative received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all labor/corporate contributions in that year, and zero otherwise.
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Sample selection model ***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Notes:
The table reports results from three different econometric models for the probability of voting in favor of IRCA. Column (1) reports mean marginal effects from a probit model. Column (2) shows results from a linear probability model. Column (3) displays the results from the two-stage estimation of a Heckman sample selection model, and column (4) reports the results of the corresponding selection equation. Participation measures the share of roll call votes the representative has participated into, except for the vote on IRCA, during her term in office in the 99th Congress. 
